Who holds the dollar, and who eats the loss.
Strip the word “stablecoin” down and you are left with something the name actively hides: a stablecoin is a receipt. Someone takes an asset, locks it up, and issues a token that says “one of these tokens is redeemable for one dollar.” The dollar does not live in the token. It lives on the other side of a door, and the entire design question of a stablecoin is: who holds the dollar, what happens if the dollar loses value, and who eats the loss.
That is the whole game. Every collapse you have read about — Terra, Iron Finance, the UST depeg — is a different answer to one of those three questions going wrong. The mechanism is not that complicated; the accounting is.

Peeling: A Stablecoin Is Not a Price, It Is a Liability
A stablecoin does not “target” a dollar the way a company targets a market. It owes dollars. The peg is not a goal; it is a balance-sheet identity that has to hold at all times, and it only holds because somebody stands ready to honor the receipt.
Two families, two answers to “who holds the dollar”:
Collateralized. A real asset — dollars in a bank, treasury bills, or another cryptocurrency — sits in a vault, and the token is a claim against it. USDC and USDT are the dollar-in-a-bank version; DAI is the crypto-in-a-vault version. The receipt is honest as long as the collateral is actually there.
Algorithmic. There is no vault. The protocol mints and burns a second token in a loop, promising that arbitrage will pull the price back to a dollar. The receipt is backed by the mechanism itself, which is to say, by a bet that someone will always want to do the arbitrage trade.
collateralized: value(token) = value(collateral) · algorithmic: value(token) = value(faith in the mint/burn loop)
The uncomfortable fact that follows: every stablecoin is collateralized by something, or it is collateralized by nothing. There is no third option, and “algorithmic” is just a polite word for the second one.
The Three Ways a Peg Breaks
A stablecoin can fail in exactly three ways, and every real collapse is one of them.

The Receipt Metaphor, Taken Seriously
The receipt framing is not a flourish — it predicts which stablecoins survive and which do not, so it is worth pressing on it.
A receipt for a dollar in a bank is worth a dollar as long as the bank is solvent. A receipt for “one dollar’s worth of ETH” is worth a dollar only as long as ETH does not fall faster than the liquidation engine can react. A receipt for “one dollar’s worth of a token that is only valuable because the receipt exists” is worth a dollar only as long as everyone agrees not to notice the circularity.
That is the ranking. It is not a ranking of smartness — algorithmic designs are often more elegant. It is a ranking of how many people have to keep agreeing for the thing to hold. Collateralized-by-dollars needs one bank to stay solvent. Collateralized-by-crypto needs the market to not crash. Algorithmic needs everyone, all the time.
| Design | Backing | What breaks it | Example |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fiat-collateralized | dollars / T-bills in a bank | the bank, or the assets, are not there | USDC, USDT |
| Crypto-collateralized | another crypto asset in a vault | the collateral asset falls faster than liquidation | DAI (historically) |
| Algorithmic | the mint/burn loop itself | everyone stops believing at once | Terra UST |
1 / 1 / everyone —
counterparty you trust in a dollar-backed coin · asset you trust in a crypto-backed coin · counterparties you trust in an algorithmic coin
Why the Redemption Window Is the Whole Ballgame
The difference between “I can redeem this for a dollar” and “I can sell it to someone else for about a dollar” is the difference between a stablecoin and a slow-motion run.
Collateralized issuers redeem at par through authorized parties; algorithmic designs have no redemption — only the market, which is exactly the counterparty you need when everyone wants out at once.
In a bank-backed stablecoin, redemption is a legal and operational promise: you hand the token to an authorized party, they hand you a dollar, minus a fee. In an algorithmic one, there is no such promise — your only exit is to sell to another market participant, and in a panic the only buyers are the arbitrageurs betting the loop will snap back before it snaps you.
That is why “depeg” and “collapse” are not the same event, and why they happen on different timescales. A depeg is a price wobble; a collapse is the redemption promise being revealed as hollow. The market can smell the difference, and it prices it.

Diagnosis
The model to carry away: a stablecoin is a liability, the peg is the liability being marked to par, and the only question that matters is what stands behind it.
Ruled out: that “algorithmic” is a third kind of backing (it is zero backing, restated); that a crypto-collateralized coin is as safe as a dollar-backed one (the collateral itself is volatile, which is what the liquidation machinery exists to fight); that a depeg and a collapse are the same thing (one is a price, the other is a broken promise).
What would change my mind: a stablecoin that is fully backed by an asset at least as safe as a dollar, has a real redemption path, and survives a genuine stress event without the issuer pausing withdrawals. Those three things together are rare, and they are exactly the checklist.
A stablecoin is a receipt. Read the fine print on what the receipt is written on, because when the peg breaks, that fine print is the only thing between your token and a very expensive lesson. Concretely:
- Ask what is behind the dollar, not what the dollar claims to be. A vault of treasury bills is not the same sentence as “a token that only has value because the receipt exists.”
- Find the redemption path before you need it. If the only way out is selling to another market participant, you do not have an exit — you have a counterparty, and it is the one that disappears in a panic.
- Treat “depeg” and “collapse” as different events on different clocks. A wobble is a price; a collapse is a promise revealed as hollow. The market can tell the difference, and so should you.
(The End)


